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Introduction 
 
Why are there so many and such varied discourses about Tibet? Why do the statements about 
Tibet made by American, Chinese, and foreign organizations often appear to be quite different 
from and sometimes in contradiction to each other? This research focuses on how Tibet has 
been framed by different parties in their discourse. It examines how these parties discuss and 
portray Old Tibet (prior to the Chinese invasion) and Contemporary Tibet. With regard to Old 
Tibet I consider how Orientalist ideas have influenced and shaped the discourse on Tibet; with 
regard to Contemporary Tibet, two processes which influence the discourse on Tibet are 
discussed, namely, the commodification and the politicization of Tibet. 
 
In the first chapter I illustrate what is meant by Orientalism and how Orientalist ideas have 
influenced discourses on Old Tibet. Moreover, I present some critiques of Orientalism in the 
case of Orientalist discourse applied and addressed to Tibet and introduce the concept of 
Tibetan Nationalism. 
 
In the second chapter I discuss the master narrative on Tibet and analyze the discourses on 
Contemporary Tibet as the result and expression of two processes: the commodification and 
the politicization of Tibet. Regarding the first process, I discuss how Tibetan activists 
objectify Tibetan culture in order to advance political demands, and the risks and the limits 
this strategy has. Regarding the second process, a case study of the discourse on Tibet related 
to the implementation of the first Chinese counter-terror law and its discussion during the 
time of the 31
st
 Human Rights Council is provided. This case study serves to determine how 
the Tibetan question is politicized in the international context. When looking at 
representations of Contemporary Tibet, I consider whether Orientalist ideas are still influential 
in the media discourse. 
 
In the third chapter I analyze the impact which international events have in placing the 
Tibetan question in the spotlight of media coverage. What are the consequences these 
international events have caused in Sino-Tibetan relations? In order to discuss this question 
the segment-state theory is invoked to the extent that it can explain, through the illustration of 
past and recent occurrences of Han-Tibetan clashes, the role which international events have 
played in Sino-Tibetan relations. 
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In the fourth chapter I discuss the concept of Strategic Essentialism. This concept, theorized 
and deployed in the context of post-colonial and feminist studies, can be useful in 
understanding why various discourses on Tibet are created, internalized and reproduced by 
different parties without actually being in complete contradiction with each other. It is argued 
that, when a discourse is widely accepted, it is almost impossible to discredit it. Indeed, what 
the different parties in the game do, is to internalize it and play with it, each party demanding 
its objectives and claiming its interests. As such, the discourse on Tibet, however stereotyped, 
probably serves the interests of the parties which are at stake. 
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1. Representations of Old Tibet 
 
In this chapter I discuss the representation of Old Tibet; I analyze how Orientalist ideas 
influence the discourse on Tibet and some critiques faced by Orientalism when applied to 
Tibet. Some of the critiques maintain that Orientalism has certainly influenced, though not 
automatically determined, the discourse on Tibet. They also claim that, in contrast to the 
Tibetans’ non-agency that Orientalist ideas presuppose, a Tibetan Nationalism exists and plays 
an active role in representing Tibet in a more or less different way from dominant Orientalist 
discourses. 
 
1.1 The myth of Tibet and Orientalism: the play of opposites 
 
 The myth of Tibet mystifies Tibet, embellishing its various realities with 
mystical fancies, and mystifies the receivers of this myth, playing on the 
credulity of the receiving public. (Bourdieu 1991
1
, cited in Lopez 1998) 
 
Where does the myth of Tibet come from? This section focuses on the myth of Tibet and it 
looks at it as connected to an Orientalist tradition and Orientalist approach to the East or to 
“the Other”. 
 
The myth of Tibet can be regarded as belonging to an approach to dealing with the Orient 
which is named Orientalism. When looking at the myth of Tibet, what is immediately evident 
is the uncritical Westerners’ point of view and their pretension of being legitimized to hold the 
power and authority to talk about Tibet, interpret Tibetan history and Sino-Tibetan relations. 
Not only does the West
2
 construct this discourse, but it also claims the same discourse to be 
true. Let me firstly introduce what is meant by Orientalism. In Said’s words (Said: 1979):   
 
Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution 
for dealing with the Orient—dealing with it by making statements about 
it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling 
                                                            
1 Pierre Bourdieu, (1991) Language and Symbolic power, trans. Gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson, 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
2 In this study I refer to the West as being the US and Europe. It is argued that talking about “West” and “East” is 
not completely appropriate because these labels are simply conventions. These labels are indeed “constructed”, 
rather than naturally existing. However, as they are still part of a commonly used convention between scholars 
and they appear to be largely used in the sources selected, this study  will deploy them. 
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over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, 
restructuring, and having authority over the Orient  (Said 1979: 
3)(emphasis in the original). 
 
Orientalism is a way of thinking that is based on the presupposed difference between the 
Orient and the Occident, with the Occident located in a superior position to the Orient. In this 
view, when looking at the myth of Tibet, the play of opposites is between ‘the pristine and 
polluted, the authentic and the derivative, the holy and the demonic, the good and the bad’ 
(Lopez 1998: 4). These opposites are portrayed by the West precisely because they serve as a 
way to emphasize the dichotomies between Orient and Occident; these dichotomies are man-
made, and rather than being geographical constructs, they are historical ones. One example of 
these oppositions Lopez notes is the invasion of Tibet by the Chinese People’s Liberation 
Army. The Chinese occupation of Tibet is seen as a tragic victory of ‘the power of darkness 
against the power of light’ (Lopez 1998: 7). The Chinese occupation is therefore represented 
as a mass of atheist Communists invading a holy land whose inhabitants are only devoted to 
pious and divine pursuits, portraying millions of Tibetans as victims of Chinese brutalities. 
‘Tibet embodies the spiritual and the ancient, China the material and the modern.’ (Lopez 
1998: 7). In this case the volatility of the myth of Tibet is evident. Lopez shows that, in the 
case of Tibet, the play of dichotomies has been simultaneously radical and unsubstantial, and 
is still very present in the contemporary views of Tibet. He further argues that ‘in the 
continual play of opposites, the view of Old Tibet as good is put forward by the Tibetan 
government-in-exile; the representation of Old Tibet as bad is appropriated by the Chinese 
government in its campaign to incorporate the nation of Tibet into China’ (Lopez 1998: 10-11). 
It can be seen how different representations of Tibet are internalized by different parties 
claiming different interests. 
 
Orientalism can also be deployed to explain the Tibetan incorporation of the Western myth of 
Tibet. What can be noted in the Tibetan myth is the confluence of the Tibetan myth of Tibet 
and the Western myth of Tibet (both in opposition with the Chinese view of Tibet). Tibetans, 
and especially the Tibetan government in exile, have incorporated the Western discourse on 
Tibet and have played with it for their own political purposes: the convergence of the Tibetan 
and Western myths of Tibet has been deployed, for instance, in order to advance requests for 
more autonomy (and sometimes eventually independence) from the Chinese government and 
in order to ask for international support and aid in the Tibetan cause. 
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Finally, Orientalism can also be understood as a Western way to project, reflect and to mirror 
itself in the fantastic image of Tibet. The Tibetan myth, as represented by the West and for the 
West, sees ‘the Land of Snows only as it was reflected in the elaborately framed mirror of 
Western fantasies about Tibet’ (Lopez 1998: 200). It is through this reflection, and process of 
what is called double-gaze, that the confluence of the Western and Tibetan discourse has 
occurred. This discourse portrays Tibet as everything the West wants: as such, the West, 
through the lens of romanticism, sees Tibet as a “regenerating medicine”, as a saviour of the 
cynical and materialist West; ‘Tibet is seen as the cure for an ever-dissolving Western 
civilization, restoring its spirit’ (Lopez 1998: 202). Because isolated from a chaotic globe for 
so long, Tibet is regarded as the cradle of high ideals, religious practices, and spiritualism in 
opposition to materialism (Lopez 1998: 203). This purifier mission, deploying the myth of 
Tibet as the discourse to justify both the origin of the idyllic Tibet society and the need not 
only to preserve Tibetan culture, religion and beliefs, but also to learn from that to purify the 
West, is nothing more than a representation of the West. This auto-representation serves two 
purposes: the first is to legitimize the Western intervention in Sino-Tibetan relations with 
regard to the Tibetan question; the second is to provide the West with a positive and idealized 
image of itself and its values. In fact, the West is engaged in a struggle between, on the one 
hand, its universal liberal values and its willingness to protect the oppressed Tibetan 
community, and, on the other hand, Chinese authoritative, communist values and Chinese 
oppression which harm innocent Tibetan victims. Framed as such, the West becomes the 
liberator from the oppressor, the defender of human rights, justice personified. Eventually, the 
mythical understanding of Tibet is advocated to support the West’s mythical understanding of 
itself: it satisfies Westerners’ emotional needs, although denying a correct analysis of reality. 
 
The result of the Orientalist approach towards Tibet is that, in Lopez’s words, ‘we all are 
prisoners of Shangri-La’ (Lopez 1998: 13). 
 
In other words: Lopez’s argument is that Tibet has for long been imagined in Western fantasy. 
This fantasy is constructed as being non-chronological and unchangeable: this construction is 
considered ‘a mythical hyper-reality created by and for Westerners’ (Dreyfus 2005: 2). Tibet 
becomes the field for the play of dichotomies: Tibet represents either the idyllic society, the 
land of snows, Buddhism, a mysterious myth or its opposite, that is, a hierarchical society, an 
isolated land with a severe theocratic regime. These dichotomies are still very much present in 
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the Western and Chinese discourse on Tibet. As only these stereotypes persist and circulate 
while historical facts are not taken into account, Tibet maintains its status of an object of 
imagination. Lopez finally points out that this idealisation of Tibet can be harmful in terms of 
threatening to remove Tibet from the arena of political engagement and political motion 
(Dreyfus 2005: 2). Even though these considerations offer precious insights, some of them 
have been criticized because they treat the Orientalist discourse as all-pervading guidelines, 
and as a systematic pattern impossible to avoid, thus leaving little space for Tibetan counter-
representations. I show more thoroughly the critique of  Lopez's Prisoners of Shangri-La in 
the following part.    
 
1.3 Critique of Orientalism in the case of Tibet 
 
As it has been shown above, Lopez has analyzed how the West has been appropriating Tibet 
through the Orientalist lens. However, the way in which he shows how ‘Tibet has been 
Tibetanized’3 (Dreyfus 2005: 2) does not leave any action to the Tibetan incorporation and co-
construction of this discourse. In this way, Lopez’s argument has basically reiterated and 
reproduced the same attitude as he is actually trying to criticize. Dreyfus’ critique of Lopez’s 
book mainly concerns his overwhelming claim that ‘we all are prisoners of Shangri-La.’ 
Dreyfus raises the question of who this ‘we’ refers to. In Lopez’s claim, this ‘we’ refers not 
only to Westerners (which is quite straightforward: here the prisoners are the people who 
produce and share the culture that has produced the mythical representations of Tibet), but 
also Tibetans, including their leader, the Dalai Lama (Ibid.: 3). In fact, with regard to the 
Dalai Lama’s alignment with orientalist fantasies Lopez analyzes some of the Dalai Lama’s 
published works in order to prove their inter-connection and submission to the orientalist 
mainstream discourse. In order to prove this submission, Lopez analyzed the Dalai Lama’s 
writings in terms of their commitment to two concepts, namely, Buddhist modernism and 
nationalism. Let me briefly explain what these two concepts are. 
  
Buddhist modernism 
  
                                                            
3 Dreyfus has paraphrased Said’s expression ‘Orient has been Orientaized’ in the case of Tibet. For Said, the 
Orient as studied by Orientalists is not just some part of the world “out there.” (...) Rather, the Orient is 
constructed – or “orientalized” – as the object to be represented and controlled by the West (Said 1979: 5). 
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Buddhist modernism developed at the end of the nineteenth century as a way to portray 
Buddhism positively by showing the Buddhist tradition in modern terms, for instance, 
claiming that Buddhism fits and is congruous with modern science, and is not based on 
superstition. These ideas match well with the ones of the Dalai Lama. Nonetheless, Lopez’s 
claim that the connection between some of the Dalai Lama’s views and this modernist 
position can thus make it evident that the Dalai Lama has absorbed the orientalist discourse 
and that even he is a prisoner of Shangri-La, is, in Dreyfus’ view, a rushed conclusion. 
   
Nationalism 
 
The date of the origin and development of Tibetan Nationalism is considered by Lopez to be 
the year 1959, the year in which the Dalai Lama went into exile. Lopez argues that before 
1959 Tibetans lacked national consciousness. It is 1959 is the year in which Tibetans started 
to see themselves as being part of a nation and a real nationalist sense arose; 1959 is also the 
year in which Tibet for the first time had a contact and exchange with the West (Dreyfus 2005: 
5). After having the first contact with the West, because Tibetans needed a language for 
representing themselves to the West, they internalized (passively) the only discourse 
accessible to them, that is, the Western orientalist discourse. Again, this conclusion lacks 
evidences those demonstrate it. Dreyfus revealed that, before 1959, Tibetans already had ‘a 
sense of collective identity derived from their cultural mores (e.g., eating rtsam pa – roasted 
barley flour) and regional affiliations’ (Dreyfus 2005:5). 
   
According to Lopez’s arguments (1) everyone, even Tibetans and the Dalai Lama, are 
prisoners of orientalist fantasies and (2) Tibetan nationalism is a mere passive incorporation 
and reproduction of Western imaginations of Tibet. These arguments threaten to over-simplify 
a far more multifaceted situation. Let me now move onto Dreyfus’ considerations about the 
lack of substance and inconsistency of Lopez’s arguments. 
   
Firstly, with regard to the role played by Buddhist modernism as influenced by Western ideas 
to shape the Dalai Lama’s ideas, he considers that the impact of Western ideas were quite 
limited in the Dalai Lama’s formative years; when he began to have more contacts with the 
West, his frame of Buddhist modernism was largely already designed. It is therefore quite 
misleading to portray the Dalai Lama as instantaneously becoming infatuated with the 
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Western orientalist fantasies (Dreyfus 2005: 7). 
4
 It has also been argued that it would be 
misleading to over-stress the role played by Buddhist modernism when considering the 
complete intellectual formation of the Dalai Lama; even if he has embraced modernity, he has 
not automatically and consistently repudiated Tibetan traditions (Ibid.: 9). 
   
Secondly, with regard to the lack of national self-consciousness, it is argued that this argument 
is ahistorical. It is believed that since the thirteenth or fourteenth century Tibetans considered 
themselves as being part of a community which shared memories (such as the Ma ṇi 
bka’ ’bum)5 (Dreyfus 2005: 11). This form of collective consciousness would eventually 
develop into modern nationalism during the 1950s. In this period, Tibetan nationalism 
deployed religious motives to denote the nation, for instance, the traditional Buddhist 
concepts of compassion, and karma (Ibid.: 12). Because of the presence of religious motives 
to brand the nation, the form of nationalism developed is called Religious Nationalism. As 
such, the Tibetan religious nationalism and the rise of Tibetan national consciousness owe 
more to traditional Buddhist values than to Western orientalist ideas. 
   
Finally, the relevant role of Tibetan agency in its active commitment of combining and 
synthesising Tibetan traditional with Western values, rather than internalizing passively 
Western values, must be noted. This agency eventually denies Lopez’s argument that even the 
Dalai Lama and Tibetans are prisoners of Shangri-La. When Tibetans have invoked the 
orientalist discourse, they have strategically used it, transformed it and played with it (Ibid.: 
14). In this way, for instance, the Dalai Lama in his speeches refers to some orientalist images 
to put forward his idea of Tibet (which combines both Western values, for example, human 
rights, and Tibetan traditional values, for example, compassion). To conclude, the result of the 
contact between Tibetan traditions and Western ideas cannot be reduced to orientalism; rather 
than that, the result of this contact is a hybrid product. 
 
                                                            
4 Dreyfus points out that the ‘Dalai Lama’s views were formed more through contact with Indian ideas than with 
Western ones.’ (Dreyfus 2005: 7). 
5 Dreyfus claims that Tibetans did not develop a proper form of nationalism before 1950. The reasons why 
Tibetans failed to develop nationalistic views before then is grounded in the social structures of Tibetan society 
(characterized by rigid conservatism and the dominant position of monasteries).                                                                                 
Another reason is situated in the Tibetan leading elite’s decision to keep Tibet isolated from the rest of Asia (in 
the 18th -19th century). This choice ‘prevented Tibet from developing the kind of institutions – such as print 
capitalism, a well-equipped army, and schools – that could have led to the development of a modern 
nationalism’(Dreyfus 2005: 10). For an analysis with regard to the connection between these institutions and the 
origins and spread of nationalism, see Anderson (1983). 
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1.4 Struggle between Tibetan and Chinese nationalism(s): the importance of the 
collective memory 
 
I mentioned above the topic of Tibetan nationalism; it has been shown how nationalism has 
originated and developed in Tibet from the 1950s onwards. In this section, some notions will 
be provided on how nationalism is related to a community’s shared images and a common 
view of its past. These notions reflect the idea that the ways in which communities remember 
their past deploy nationalistic themes. Therefore the problematic controversy between how 
Tibetans remember their past and how Chinese remember theirs is raised. Remembering what 
and how is considered problematic; indeed, it is argued that history and communities’ pasts 
can evolve into a ground of political struggle (Schneider forthcoming: 115). The following 
discussion serves to understand why different discourses on Old Tibet have become part of 
the collective memory of Chinese and Tibetan communities. It is argued that, once a certain 
discourse has become part of the collective memory of a community and of its national history, 
it is hardly improbable that  its veracity will be further questioned. This is because that 
discourse has been charged with patriotic, nationalist and personal feelings. 
 
In China, Chinese history plays a great and decisive role with regard to Chinese identity and 
the legitimacy of the Chinese leadership. To quote Schneider: ‘The CCP’s legitimacy is 
closely tied to particular interpretations of history, and any scholarly debate that brings to light 
the nuances of the past is unwelcome’ (Ibid: 115). Therefore, the CCP is actively committed to 
keeping under control discourses referring to Chinese history (especially the historical 
discourses which narrate Sino-Japanese history, Sino-Tibetan history, and Sino-Xinjiang 
history). 
 
This commitment reflects the CCP’s view of the past as a temple or a shrine: in this view 
history is one immutable and dominant narrative in which historical events state what is truth 
and what is falsehood. This view is necessarily at odds with the view of the past as a forum in 
which multiple voices enter into a continuous discussion; the people involved in this 
discussion treat historical facts as tools to make (multiple) meanings, rather than to construct a 
single truth.
6
 The view of the past as a temple, embraced by the CCP, is actually embraced by 
all nations when they construct their past: discourses about the past are deployed by national 
                                                            
6 The two approaches in which to view the past are discussed in Wertsch James V. (2002), Voices of Collective 
Remembering. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (pp.667-715). Cited in Schneider forthcoming: 116. 
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leadership and institutions (for instance educational institutions such as schools) to create a 
sense of community that shares a collective history. This construction of collective history, 
also called collective remembering, is so dogmatic and exclusive that it does not accept any 
competing alternative (Ibid.: 116). In order to construct this idea of collective remembering, 
nations reiterate their community’s past in the form of a coherent narrative and, successively, 
persuade their members that their own personal experience is a constituent fragment of this 
great patchwork which constitutes “The National History” (as such, the relevant and true 
history is the one felt rather than the chronological one
7
). This process that constructs and 
fosters the individual memory and the overlap with the (national) collective past is facilitated 
by media discourses. 
 
Discourses of collective memory do not only refer to the living history, but also to the non-
experienced past, and is here where the individually-felt memory and pervasiveness of the 
media plays an important role: media discourses about the past are a tool for shaping and 
forging personal feelings of the past. These discourses establish how members belonging to a 
community absorb these collective narratives, and sometimes these narratives come to be felt 
as personal memories (Ibid.: 118). 
 
In this view, it is now understandable why the history and the past of Tibet has been largely 
re-written by China in order to justify its invasion of Tibet in 1951 (Blondeau & Buffetrille 
2008: 214). This history only takes into account the Chinese version of the history of Tibet to 
serve Chinese nationalist purposes: indeed, it represents Tibet as having been part of China 
since the twenty-third century, thus silencing Tibetan claims to any political independence 
(independence de facto) in the twentieth century (Ibid.). On the other hand, Tibetan 
representations of Tibet as being independent (de facto) in the twentieth century serve Tibetan 
nationalist purposes. This is only one of the several examples those can be cited which shows 
two different versions of a discourse on Old Tibet defended by Tibetans and Chinese. Here it 
is important to highlight the connection between the way one community remember its past 
and the modalities in which the discourse about a nation’s past are framed by the institutions 
in charge of the teaching of history. Therefore the way Chinese people or Tibetan people 
remember Old Tibet becomes a national trait. 
 
                                                            
7 Guibernau, Montserrat (2004), Anthony D. Smith on Nations and National Identity: A Critical Assessment, 
Nations and Nationalism, 10(1/2), p.135. Quoted in Schneider 2016: 117. 
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Finally, it is worth remarking that what is important and decisive in constructing the national 
collective past is not historical facts; rather, it is the discourse of the past, which circulates and 
has frequently been reproduced by the media, that plays a central role. At this point, one 
question can legitimately be raised: How does this discourse work in the media? How do 
some discourses gain credibility and legitimacy, thus circulating through the media, while 
some others are silenced? In the next part, I illustrate the power of the discourse in the media 
and how it works.     
 
1.5 The power of the discourse in the media 
 
Definition 
Symbolic power in the media: power that the media holds when communicating content to the 
public, allowing their discourse to influence the minds of the members of the public (Fuchs 
2015: 13). 
 
As shown in the previous sections, the discourse of (old, independent) Tibet and the discourse 
of China's Tibet have actually created and reproduced two notions of Tibet, neither of which 
is founded on objective historical data but either on utopian myths of Tibet, or on Chinese 
chauvinistic historiography. Both discourses are relatively pervasive and are charismatically 
defended and reproduced across the media (the utopian discourse across foreign media, the 
chauvinistic discourse across Chinese media). In the current historical period, the media 
occupies a particularly important and pivotal position in creating and reproducing discourses 
about all kinds of dimensions, fields, disciplines (economic, political, cultural and so on). 
Creating and reproducing discourses is a form of media power; allow me to clarify what 
media power is and what its forms of power and counter-power are, borrowing from Fuchs, 
and re-adapting the following table for the purposes of this paper:
 8
 
 
 
 
                                                            
8 Fuchs have classified three dimensions of media power: economic media power, political media power and 
cultural media power. For the purpose of this thesis, only two dimensions of media power (the cultural media 
power and the political media power) have been selected because of their relevance; the economic media power, 
which focuses on the media concentration in the hands of few companies, the influence of companies on the 
media via advertising, the unequal distribution of economic resources appears not to be relevant for this 
discussion. For further analysis of the whole table, look at Fuchs 2015: 15-16. 
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Dimension of media power Forms of media power Forms of media counter-
power 
Political media power state censorship of the media; 
the unequal distribution of 
political resources (influence, 
decision power, political 
relations) allows political elites 
more influence on and control of 
the media 
Media regulation that 
guarantees quality in 
information and news reporting, 
freedom of expression and 
opinion 
 
 
Cultural media power dominant discourses (master 
narratives) influence of 
dominant media; 
the unequal distribution of 
cultural resources (reputation, 
prestige, legitimacy, credibility) 
allows groups and institutions 
(especially educational 
institutions) more influence on 
and control of the media 
creation of counter-institutions 
that produce and reproduce 
counter-discourses and 
manage their own media 
 
Table 1: Power and counter-power in the media (based on Fuchs 2015: 15-16) (emphasis added). 
 
In the previous sections I constantly talked about discourse and how discourse influences the 
knowledge of historical facts. I can now relate discourse to media power. Media power is 
concerned with the discourse theory to the extent that, in the media, knowledge is created, 
reproduced and distributed in a certain way. This is directly influenced by who is in the 
position of being able to shape truths, and by how these truths are shaped. In fact, certain 
persons occupy positions which enable them to define which are the truths, while certain 
others are excluded from their production and negotiation (Schneider 2013: 2). These truths, 
constantly reproduced and reaffirmed, have become part of the generally accepted knowledge 
people access routinely when interacting with each other in a society in order to justify their 
daily actions and statements. 
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Media power is also related to the discourse theory regarding phenomena such as domination 
and resistance; those involve different actors competing with each other and attempting to 
maintain the supremacy of the authority of who is entitled to speak, and who should speak 
about what (Schneider 2013: 2). 
 
As such, media power shapes a discourse with regard to the Tibetan past and present in which 
both foreign media and Chinese media claim their supremacy and authority to shape the true 
discourse on Tibet; even though both deny partiality (for instance, Chinese media reiterate the 
fact that Han chauvinism towards Tibet is to be avoided and contested (Sautman 2014:177-
178)), their respective discourse is monolithic. As such, the competing discourse has been 
silenced and is not entitled to be heard through the media. This brief introduction to media 
power allows to understand why a certain discourse on Tibet is more present in the media 
rather than a competing one: institutions and persons who hold more power are in the position 
both to shape the discourse on Tibet in the terms which serve their interests, and to allow it to 
circulate more easily in the media. This discourse has therefore been embraced by a wider 
audience and it has become a dominant discourse. 
 
In the first chapter I analyzed how the discourse about Old Tibet is framed and constructed; I 
also discussed how Orientalist and Nationalistic ideas are reflected in this discourse. The 
question that can now be asked is whether the characteristics described for the discourse 
about Old Tibet are still valid and applicable to discourses on Contemporary Tibet; this 
question leads to the discussion proposed in the second chapter. 
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2. Representations of Contemporary Tibet 
 
This chapter analyzes the discourses on Contemporary Tibet as the result and expression of 
two processes: the commodification and the politicization of Tibet. Regarding the first 
process, I discuss how Tibetan activists objectify Tibetan culture in order to advance political 
demands, and the risks and limits of this strategy. Regarding the second process, a case study 
of the discourse on Tibet related to the implementation of the first Chinese counter-terror law 
and its discussion during the 31
st.
 Human Rights Council is presented in order to determine 
how the Tibetan question is politicized in the international context. I also note how the recent 
discourses on Tibet are focused on what is called the Tibetan question and whether these 
discourses are still influenced by Orientalist ideas.    
 
The commodification process sees as its actors celebrities, film makers, and commercial 
artists. These actors are in charge of presenting an image of Tibet which is appealing to the 
audience and which has two effects. On the one hand, representing Tibet as in need of help is 
promoting more or less directly Tibetan campaigns. On the other hand, the same images 
advertise the celebrities themselves (who receive an aura of “benevolent philanthropists”) and 
their countries (remember the ‘double gaze’ concept described in the first chapter: countries 
and their citizens need to reflect their values to another entity which serves as their mirror and 
enables them to legitimize their own values). 
 
The politicization process sees as its actors NGOs which campaign for Tibet, activists and 
also the governments of some foreign countries. These actors politicize the Tibetan issue in 
terms of politicizing human rights. In effect, recently, the Chinese central government warned 
foreign institutions and personages not to politicize human rights in Tibet and not to turn the 
Tibetan question into an international dispute (China defends the argument that the Tibetan 
issue is part of its internal affairs, therefore the governments of foreign countries and 
organizations do not have the right to interfere). 
 
In this chapter I analyze these two processes; both processes make use of the media to sustain 
their discourses. For example, Tibet celebrities, who include Richard Gere and the Dalai 
Lama, make extensive use of the media to promote a certain image of Tibet. The discourse 
these actors promote in the media has the potential to influence the audience’s view on Tibet 
and to shape an image of Tibet and of the Tibetan question which is, as the Orientalist idea 
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portrays, stereotyped and one-sided. Let me take a step back; let me explain firstly what 
discourse and master narrative are widely circulating in the media and are promoted by 
cultural, educational and governmental institutions. Subsequently I analyze the two processes 
I have introduced. 
 
2.1 Discourse, Master Narrative on Tibet and Power Relations 
 
In this introductory paragraph to chapter two I give an explanation of what discourse is in the 
Foucauldian sense and how this notion of discourse and its relation with power exemplifies 
the discourse on Tibet and its relation with power. Secondly, I give an explanation of what the 
master narrative on Tibet is and its relations with power. 
 
First of all, what is meant by discourse? According to Foucault (1980), discourses are 
everywhere and they mediate as well as frame all aspects of our life. Discourses create and 
limit knowledge and build regimes of truth for people in order to enable them to make sense 
of the world. 
 
Foucault further argues that the production of knowledge is ultimately connected to power 
relations. Indeed, power regulates the way in which knowledge and truth are produced, 
reproduced and maintained. The connection between the production of knowledge and power 
relations also works in the opposite direction, that is, knowledge allows the existence of, 
enhances and legitimates power relations. Those in the most predominant positions of power 
create versions of how to know the world, and because they are constantly reproduced and 
reaffirmed by institutions, by media and social groups those maintain power and credibility, 
they turn them into ‘unquestioned words and start to seem normal’ (Schneider 2013: 3).    
 
Secondly, what is a master narrative and what is the master narrative on Tibet? In order to 
answer this question, Yu’s study will be considered. 
 
Definition of master narrative: ‘A master narrative is a totalizing schema, which orders and 
explains reality, experience, and knowledge. Any master narrative is potentially oppressive as 
it implies a master-slave relation while one way of seeing the world is aggrandized, all other 
ways of knowing are suppressed’ (Yu 2010: 1). 
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In his study (Yu 2010), the author analyzes the discourse on Tibet circulating in the popular 
culture and educational institutions in the USA. Through this analysis, he argues that this 
discourse has become a master narrative to the extent that it has become unquestioned and all-
pervading. 
 
Yu’s analysis firstly considers the role popular media plays in shaping the public views of 
Tibet. Hollywood productions (for instance Seven Years in Tibet), deploying a sympathetic 
tone towards Old Tibet which is represented as Shangri-La, and towards the Dalai Lama who 
is portrayed as the peaceful leader of Buddhism, have promoted the image of an old happy 
Tibet now lost because of the Chinese occupation (Yu 2010: 2). In addition to Hollywood 
productions, Western news, selected and distorted by the media also plays a significant role in 
constructing the image of the peaceful Tibetans and the violent and oppressive Chinese (Ibid.). 
 
The author secondly introduces the theme of education in his discussion because education is 
regarded as a field in which knowledge is created and fostered, a field where imagined true 
discourses circulate and are appropriated by students and scholars. Educational institutions are 
considered places which legitimately can and are enabled to tell truths. 
In this view, he shows that USA school curriculum is well aligned with the political state and 
the media, and reiterates the image of Tibet as an occupied country which has the right to 
demand and to obtain independence, and the acceptance of the Dalai Lama as the leader of the 
Tibetan people as well as an internationally recognized advocate for freedom and peace (Ibid.). 
This pervading and pervasive discourse on Tibet is considered a master narrative. 
Reflecting on the master narrative on Tibet allows me to quote his words (Yu 2010: 3): 
 
(The) master narrative about Tibet in the USA, and in the Western world 
in general, is woefully one-sided and one-dimensional. It only tells one 
particular story, from the Dalai Lama’s perspective. (…) It seems 
Americans rarely dwell on the possibility that multiple stories about 
Tibet exist and that an alternative collective historical memory about 
Tibet exists. They especially ignore the Chinese story about Tibet.  
 
The effect that this master narrative implies is that competing histories of Tibet have been 
levelled out, silenced, and a new imagined stereotypical history of Tibet has arisen. In effect, 
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master narratives depend on mythical facts and as soon as one master narrative is created and 
established, ‘it takes more than a few contradictory pedestrian facts to discredit it.’9 
Stereotypes work with the deployment of adjectives which connote characteristics represented 
as eternal truths. ‘Tibet is “isolated,” Tibetans are “content,” monks are “spiritual”’ (Lopez 
1998: 10). By constantly repeating these attributes, they assume the form of innate traits and 
qualities. Therefore, 'this language about Tibet not only creates knowledge about Tibet, in 
many ways it creates Tibet' (Ibid.); these fantasies about Tibet are deployed as truths those 
justify the legitimacy of foreign intervention, excluding and silencing any alternative truths. 
 
The master narrative about Tibet and the Dalai Lama can be considered as biased and 
distorted in both China and the USA, because both parties claim to be heralds of the truth 
about Tibet and both of them marginalize the opposite party’s critical views, rendering the 
Tibetan issue at the mercy of one-sided political propaganda (Yu 2010: 4). 
 
At this point, let me re-consider the Foucauldian discourse theories and relate them to the 
master narrative on Tibet. Considering the fact that knowledge and power join together and 
co-exist in discourses, it can be said that the master narrative on Tibet in the West (especially 
in the USA) has been framed as a regime of truth which shapes Tibet as the oppressed, in 
contrast to China, which is shaped as the oppressor. This supposedly true knowledge about 
Tibet is incorporated, reproduced and reinforced by governments, media, history textbooks 
used in educational institutions and communities of individuals. These communities of 
individuals include NGOs which campaign for Tibet, the Dalai Lama, Hollywood film makers, 
and politicians. This supposed truth has been constantly told, while competing truths have 
been constantly excluded as a logical counter-action (Ibid.). 
 
Romanticized and mythical views of Tibet, even though very appealing, are to be challenged 
and not taken for granted by educational institutions, media and governments which are 
constructing the discourse on Tibet now in circulation. The master narrative on Tibet, by 
deploying the orientalist myth of Tibet, also shapes the knowledge about Contemporary Tibet 
to the extent that it influences the knowledge about Contemporary Tibet present in modern 
history books, in recent film productions and in the recent approaches regarding the Tibetan 
                                                            
9 It is argued that any master narrative can be challenged only ‘by a collectively experienced, emotionally and 
morally charged triumph or frustration’ (Madsen, Richard (1995) China and the American Dream: A Moral 
Inquiry. Berkeley: University of California Press, p. 60). 
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question foreign governments have with China. This master narrative portrays Contemporary 
Tibet in a fixed continuity with Old Tibet; as such, knowledge about Tibet (both 
Contemporary and Old) continues to come from one prospective, the prospective which 
reiterates the orientalist myth of Tibet. 
 
In this section the role which governmental, educational and media institutions play in the 
construction and reproduction of the master narrative on Tibet becomes clear. Here I have 
also mentioned the fact that actors, both in popular culture (for instance film makers) and 
foreign governments have unquestioningly embraced the master narrative on Tibet and that 
the representations of Tibet they currently promote are therefore aligned with this master 
narrative. The embrace of the master narrative on Tibet has lead these to represent 
Contemporary Tibet in two ways, by commodifying Tibet and by politicizing Tibet. Let me 
proceed to the discussion on the commodification and politicization of Tibet carried out by 
popular culture actors and foreign governments. 
 
2.3 Commodification of Tibet 
 
The commodification of Tibet has involved an objectification of the Tibetan culture within the 
representations of Tibet in the mass media for the purposes of political and cultural activism 
(McLagan 2002: 90). In order to defend this statement, McLagan (2002) examines the role 
played by Tibet celebrities (she mainly examines the role of the Dalai Lama and Richard Gere) 
during the years 1991-1992, a time in which Tibet activists organized an international 
political campaign (which took the name of the Year of Tibet). She looks at this campaign, 
highlighting the spectacular moments, because in the era of mass media (newspaper, radio, 
television, Internet) spectacles and theatrical images have occupied more and more central 
positions for political legitimacy. Even though political spectacles and theatrical images are 
not new, the pervasiveness of promotion, advertisement, and popular culture in politics has 
reached an unprecedented degree (Ibid.: 91). In this way, culture becomes a strategic tool and 
an excuse to justify and promote political mobilization. This political mobilization and 
activism ‘is a mode of mobilization that combines cultural spectacle, celebrity, and media to 
powerful effect, one that has become an increasingly significant means through which 
diasporic, indigenous, and other marginalized groups make political claims and construct their 
collective identities’ (McLagan 2002: 91). 
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However, this process of strategic commodification and objectification of culture has its 
dilemmas: in fact, it is noted that when the culture of a marginalized group is objectified, it is 
also usually homogenized and essentialized (See chapter 4 on Strategic Essentialism). As 
such, these essentialized views of differences flow into a stereotyped discourse of the Other 
(in contrast with that of the Self) which might deny the historical and political role of the 
marginalized group. In the case of Tibet, I have already shown how its discourse has focused 
on the exotic, the representation of Tibet as mysterious, as Shangri-La and so on. Thus, this 
discourse has the potential to turn the (passive) popular fascination and admiration of Tibet 
into an active political support for the Tibetan cause; however, it might also deny agency to 
Tibetans. 
 
McLagan further examines the most salient events and exhibitions that took place in New 
York during the Year of Tibet (1991-1992). She looked more extensively at how these events 
had been advertised and framed by the mass media (managed mostly by non-Tibetans and 
non-Buddhist personnel). In her study, some of the discussions between activists and event 
promoters have been analyzed to the extent that they reflect a wider tension between the 
political goals of the Tibetan government in exile and how they are appropriated by American 
mass media and portrayed in the public sphere (Ibid.: 92). The American media coverage of 
Tibet has succeeded in gathering public interest and in sensitizing the audience with regard to 
the Tibetan issue but, at the same time, it has also risked obfuscating its political content and 
it has “banalized” it. 
 
International support for Tibet started when the Dalai Lama was awarded the Nobel Peace 
Prize in 1989. Moreover, the demonstrations held in the capital city of Tibet, Lhasa, during 
the years 1987 and 1988, in which the violent repression by the Chinese was witnessed by 
Westerners and publicized in foreign media, initiated the American and European support for 
Tibet (Ibid.:93-94). However, it is celebrity engagement in Tibet (mostly Tibetan Buddhism) 
that has caused increasing interest for the Tibetan question: some of the most well-known 
celebrities committed to the Tibetan cause are Richard Gere and the Beastie Boys.
10
 Since 
their involvement Tibet has received a great deal of media coverage in the West and it has 
                                                            
10 In 1993 Richard Gere stood up at the Academy Award ceremonies and urged China to negotiate with the Dalai 
Lama (the television show reached 1 billion people audience). In 1996, 1997, 1998 and 1999 the Beastie Boys 
performed in the Tibetan Freedom Concerts (thousands of people went to the concerts and millions of viewers 
followed the concerts on MTV) (McLagan 2002: 94). 
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turned into an interesting topic for Hollywood film makers (the most famous film about Tibet, 
which is Seven Years in Tibet, was, indeed, released in the 1990s, more specifically in 1997). 
 
In McLagan’s analysis, she showed how the Year of Tibet, whose agenda was marked by 
public talks by the Dalai Lama, and ‘dance, chanting, and butter sculpture performances by 
Tibetan monks’, had been conceived to be ‘a spectacle in the service of politics’ (Ibid.: 95), 
which means turning the audience of these events into political supporters of the Tibetan 
cause. It has been said by the employees of the event, for instance, that, in order to mobilize 
political action and to engage more people in the commitment of campaigning for Tibet, the 
easiest way is to deploy the discourse of culture. This discourse aims at persuading the 
audience ‘to fall in love with Tibet through seeing the beauty of Tibet’s culture’ (Ibid.: 96). As 
soon as the public has fallen in love with Tibet, it is keener on doing something actively for it, 
which means supporting the Tibetan cause in order to save the “endangered” Tibetan culture 
and save Tibet from the brutalities and violation of human rights the Chinese government is 
committing in Tibet. The problem is that, this discourse of culture often makes use of 
narratives of Tibet which embrace and reproduce Western stereotypes and myths of Tibet (for 
instance the Orientalist portrayals of Tibet). In so doing, these narratives deny and ignore the 
representation of Tibet as historical and political agent with specific political demands. 
 
To summarize: In this section it has been highlighted how Tibetan activism is seen as a 
cultural struggle, that is a struggle over meanings rather than over economic or political 
positions. It has been shown how these struggles employ symbolic processes, such as 
discourse formation, in order to promote their aims. As such, if Tibetan activists want to 
receive media coverage, they have to compromise with the Western frames (e.g. the demand 
of spectacles) of the media which represents them. However, McLagan also reveals that this 
acceptance of Western frames does not imply any automatic or direct effect on the Tibetan 
issue. For instance, because media effects are not easily measurable, it is not clear whether 
this kind of Tibetan activism has actually influenced American and European foreign policy 
toward Sino-Tibetan relations (McLagan 2002: 106). It can finally be said that the strategic 
objectification of a culture should not be considered as a mere process of commodification 
and consumption of any product; rather, in this process, it is necessary to look at who is 
objectifying that culture and what their aims are. 
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Let me now go through the second mode of representation of Contemporary Tibet, which 
makes use of the politicization of human rights for stressing the urgency to find a solution for 
the Tibetan question. I firstly introduce what is called the Tibetan question and secondly 
propose an analysis of the discourse on Tibet related to the implementation of the first 
Chinese counter-terror law. 
 
2.4 Politicization of Tibet: the Tibetan question and discourse on Tibet related to the 
first Chinese counter-terror law 
 
The Tibetan question has received much new media coverage since the Tibetan revolts and 
protests which occurred in 2008. This was the year in which China hosted the Olympic 
Games and China was therefore in the spotlight of international media coverage. Moreover, 
from 2009 until the present day, there has been a succession of self-immolations involving 
people (usually Buddhist monks) setting themselves on fire. These self-immolations have 
been another factor that has drawn international attention to Tibet, eventually leading to 
accusations of Chinese human rights violations in Tibet. Recent news reports have covered 
topics such as the first recently passed Chinese counter-terror law. This law caused the 31
st.
 
Human Rights Council (held in February and March of this year) to criticize China’s human 
rights record in the ethnic minority areas of Tibet and Xinjiang. In this section I analyze the 
discourse on Tibet released to newspapers from the time of the drafting of the law until the 
31st. Human Rights Council. These events are worth analyzing because they can well 
exemplify the process of politicization of Tibet which I would like to introduce. 
 
The notion of discourse that is used for this study is the one defined by Schneider, one which 
merges and reviews the notion of discourse of several scholars who have been studying and 
formulating the discourse theory. Schneider defines discourse as a representation of human 
thought, as a strategy that ‘refers to communication practices, which systematically construct 
our knowledge of reality’ (Schneider 2013: 5). 
 
From December 2015 to March 2016, - in Chinese and foreign media - the first Chinese 
counter-terror law was discussed, a law which is believed to have consistent consequences for 
some foreign companies in China, especially those providing Internet and mobile services, for 
companies in the media sector (especially in the information sector, that is, newspapers and 
television) and for ethnic minorities which can be targeted as extremist or separatist, namely, 
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Tibetans and Uighurs. Before and during the 31
st.
 Human Rights Council the above-
mentioned law was specifically criticized by some parties as a law which might violate 
human rights in the ethnic minority areas of Tibet and Xinjiang. The discourse on the counter-
terror law has resulted in remarkable media coverage of the Tibetan question. 
 
I examine, therefore, how the issue of Tibet has been framed by the Chinese central 
government, the European Parliament, and the NGO International Campaign for Tibet, from 
the time of the drafting the first Chinese counter-terror law (December 2015) until the 31
st.
 
Human Rights Council (February/March 2016), the occasion on which the law was discussed. 
I analyze the discourse on this law because it created a great deal of resonance in the Council 
and in the media and because it exemplifies well the representation of Tibet as a politicized 
issue. 
 
Firstly, I examine how the Chinese newspaper Xinhua describes the Chinese government 
views about the counter-terror law and its implications for Tibet and the global community. 
The newspaper Xinhua has been selected because it is regarded as the official voice of the 
Chinese central government. I also analyze how Chinese media have answered the 
accusations made by the US and other foreign countries with regard to the likelihood of the 
counter-terror law violating human rights in Tibet. 
 
Secondly, the European Parliament’s stance and view on the counter-terror law is analyzed. I 
have chosen the European Parliament because it represents a community of countries which 
have an important role in the Human Rights Council. In the previous sections I have already 
covered thoroughly the role the US plays in shaping the discourse on Tibet. The other 
important Western actor in the articulation of the discourse on Tibet is Europe, therefore in 
this section I have decided to focus on the European contribution in the framing and shaping 
of representations of Tibet. 
 
Finally, I analyze articles related to the counter-terror law on the websites of the NGO 
International Campaign for Tibet. I have decided to focus on this NGO because it appears to 
be a major NGO campaigning for Tibet (it has four branches in four different countries, 
namely, Belgium, The Netherlands, Australia, and Germany) and its media coverage of the 
Human Rights Council (especially with regard to the counter-terror law) appears to be the 
most thorough. Other international NGOs campaigning for Tibet have not thoroughly covered 
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the implications for Tibet with regard to the counter-terror law; thus it is not significant or 
worthwhile to consider them in this context. 
     
The parties and media tools analyzed are: 
 The Chinese central government: www.xinhuanet.com/english/  
 The European Parliament: www.europarl.europa.eu, eeas.europa.eu  
 The NGO campaigning for Tibet International Campaign for Tibet (ICT): 
www.savetibet.org 
 
Discourse analysis
11
 
 
In the three articles
12
 released and analyzed by Xinhua (English version), it is clear that the 
term terrorism is vaguely defined. For example one article says terrorism is considered 
everything that ‘undermines public security’, but in the law what is public security is not 
defined. Also, the articles are mainly intended not to provide an explanation of what the law is 
about, but to justify the assistance and the decryption measures which telecom operators and 
Internet services have to provide to the police and to national security authorities. As such, the 
Chinese government, as soon as it received criticism that its measures might violate the 
freedom of speech of Chinese citizens, justifies itself by pointing the finger at other countries 
(especially the USA) which  install backdoors to spy on their citizens and by justifying this 
measure as a counter-terror measure. That this discourse is mainly addressed to the US is 
demonstrated by the fact that in one article the words US and Washington are repeated 14 
times. The discourse in the articles is interestingly rich in rhetorical figures, with the 
prevalence of metaphors, antithesis and hyperbole. Metaphors are used, for instance, to 
portray China as equal to the US, as this statement clarifies: ‘the argument, however, is a 
typical example of ignoring the elephant in the room -- Only in this case, there are two 
elephants.’ Antitheses are used to contrast “good and evil;” China is represented as “good” to 
the extent that it is adopting a counter-terror law which, in this particular historical situation, 
where risks of terrorist attacks are on the daily agenda, it is necessary to have; the US and 
other countries criticizing this law are represented as the “evil” part because they themselves 
have counter-terror laws which breach citizens’ privacy, but they are the first to criticize these 
                                                            
11 In the analysis I emphasize some words (in italics) to draw the attention on the expressions significant for the 
purpose of the analysis. 
12Xinhua 27/12/2015a, Xinhua 27/12/2015b, Xinhua 11/03/2016. 
Page 25 of 42 
 
measures when are incorporated into Chinese law. Some examples as to how Xinhua refers to 
the US and foreign countries are these statements: ‘the United States itself has created 
grounds for breeding terrorism;’ ‘worries about the new law are nothing but a far-fetched 
notion;’ ‘the United States came up with such a sensational and irresponsible conclusion 
regarding the Chinese legislation;’ ‘the legislation is by no means an excuse for a foreign 
country to make unwarranted distasteful criticism against China.’ Some examples of how 
Xinhua refers to China are these statements: ‘the country's first counter-terror law (…) help 
maintain the world’s security;’ ‘the rule (…) was basically the same as other major countries;’ 
‘the clause (…) is a result of wide solicitation of public opinion;’ ‘it will not affect (…) 
citizens’ freedom of speech and their religious freedom.’ Hyperbole is used when responding 
to the accusations and concerns the US and foreign countries have shown with regard to the 
law. In order to answer these accusations, Xinhua’s articles point the finger at what other 
countries have done through the use of their counter-terror laws and national security systems. 
For instance, Xinhua writes ‘large-scale eavesdropping carried out by US authorities, drone 
attacks killing innocent civilians;’ ‘the US (…) abusing the so-called backdoor access to make 
itself the world master of eavesdropping’ and ‘rampant prison abuse in the United States (…) 
while deploring widespread gun violence and deep-rooted racism prevalent in the country.’ 
The language Xinhua’s articles employ also includes ironic phrases to describe the US: for 
instance  it writes that ‘the United States, the presumed global leader against terrorism,’ and 
‘Washington should spend more time reflecting on its counter-terror strategies and policies;’ 
‘we advise the United States and Japan to deeply reflect on themselves rather than interfere in 
the internal affairs of other states on the pretext of human rights,’ and ‘throwing dirt on China 
at every opportunity is a favored game for someone in the United States.’ These statements 
make the reader laugh at the concerns about the law felt by the US and other foreign countries, 
and they let the reader reflect on the US abuses of their national security law. The statements 
also allow the reader to ridicule American and foreign politicians who do not have anything 
more important to do than interfering in other countries’ internal affairs and the drafting of 
other countries’ laws. Xinhua’s discourse also resonates with statements those refer to Chinese 
nationalism and patriotism when framing the law as a need for protection of Chinese people: 
this is an effective strategy to unite Chinese people in approving the law by framing it as a 
measure to improve national stability and public security, and also to enhance ethnic unity. 
 
Page 26 of 42 
 
The two analyzed documents
13
 released by the European Union focus on highlighting the 
importance of defending human rights while acknowledging that China lacks ‘tangible results 
in improving its human rights’. The document on China-EU relations, among several topics it 
touches upon, refers several times to Tibet. With regard to the counter-terror law, the 
document expresses the EU Parliament’s concern that this law may have repressive 
implications and may allow repressive measures in ethnic minority areas such as Tibet and 
Xinjiang. The document uses structures and adjectives which are particularly emphatic in 
order to let the reader understand where important concepts are presented and in order to let 
him remember where the emphasis of the discourse is placed. For example it states: ‘(the EU 
Parliament) is concerned at the draft law on counter-terrorism, which may lead to further 
violations of the freedoms of expression (…), especially in Tibet and Xinjiang as regions with 
minority populations’ and, successively, ‘the definition of terrorist (…) may, if not 
substantially revised, give scope for the penalization of almost any peaceful expression of 
Tibetan culture, religion or identity that may differ from those of the state.’ The document 
further notes the harsh restrictions imposed by the Chinese government with regard to 
freedom of religion in Tibet. In that section the language employed is rich in verbs such as 
‘criticizes,’ ‘deplores’ (twice), ‘condemns’ (twice), ‘cannot understand and accept,’ and ‘is 
concerned.’ These verbs express the strong stance and position the EU Parliament is taking in 
defending freedom of religion in Tibet. In this section, indeed, the EU Parliament condemns 
the patriotic education campaign which Buddhist monks are obliged to attend, it does not 
accept the ban on images of the Dalai Lama and is concerned by the fact that Chinese law can 
be deployed to repress Buddhism in Tibet, equating religion with “separatism”. It is 
noteworthy that this discourse is very direct and focused, and it specifically addresses certain 
aspects of violations of religious freedom in Tibet. Finally, the document expresses the EU 
Parliament’s concerns about Chinese hardline policies against the Tibetan people and about 
the fact that it continues to reject the Dalai Lama’s proposal of a “genuine autonomy” for 
Tibet, and it urges the Chinese government to enter into discussion with the Dalai Lama. This 
paragraph is rich in verbs such as ‘calls for,’ ‘urges,’ ‘demands,’ ‘underlines,’ and ‘is deeply 
concerned.’ These verbs, on the one hand, express the EU’s concern about the situation in 
Tibet; on the other hand, they urge a change in attitude by the Chinese towards Tibet and its 
spiritual leader. The fact that numerous times the documents deploys emotional verbs such as 
‘is deeply concerned’ or ‘notes with concern’ have the effect of reducing and alleviating the 
                                                            
13European Parliament 16/12/2015, European Union 15/03/2016. 
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formality of the document, rendering this discourse almost paternalistic. It seems that it is 
advising a change in the Chinese attitude towards Tibet because the EU Parliament is 
concerned about the welfare of China and Chinese people. At the same time, the harsh 
attributes used to describe the violations of human rights China is carrying out in Tibet, turn 
the paternalistic discourse into an accusation and turn the urgency of change in attitude almost 
into an order, into a precondition to maintain EU-China relations. The second document urges 
China to ‘take into account concerns about the counter-terrorism legislation’ and also ‘to 
address the root causes of unrest, and to foster dialogue with different ethnic groups, 
especially in Tibet and Xinjiang.’ The fact that the document, among all the 55 ethnic groups 
present in China, specifically refers to Tibetans and Uighurs, lets the reader reflect on the high 
interest the EU Parliament has regarding these two ethnic groups. 
 
The three articles
14
 published by the International Campaign for Tibet focus on the 
implications the counter-terror law have specifically in Tibet. One article stresses the fact that 
the US, Japan, the EU, Germany and Canada, in a joint action, reported concerns with regard 
to the new law, and it effectively uses this action to justify the accusations that this law is ‘a 
major threat to human rights in China and Tibet, as particularly Tibetans run even more 
danger of being persecuted for their peaceful expression of religion, belief or opinion.’ It can 
be seen from this statement how it has effectively used the representation of Tibetans as 
peacefully expressing their religion, and the representation of the Chinese law as a danger and 
threat to them. This antithesis recurs in all three articles. The articles also argue that the new 
counter-terror law ‘will specifically target Tibetans and Uighurs.’ This statement goes far 
beyond the concerns for Tibet expressed by the EU Parliament. Other statements are even 
more radical in the deployment of negative attributes to describe the new law and its 
consequences for Tibet. For instance one article states: ‘China has passed its first counter-
terror law, rejecting the concerns from international governments that draconian measures in 
the name of national security are being used to crack down on Tibetans (...);’ ‘the new law 
follows the imposition of oppressive and counter-productive policies in Tibet and Xinjiang, 
involving extra-judicial killings, torture and imprisonment, and crackdowns on even mild 
expression of religious identity and culture.’ It further states: ‘peace and stability cannot be 
achieved through hyper-securitization and suppression of human rights.’ This hyperbolic and 
emphatic language is used to let the reader feel empathy with Tibetans, who are portrayed as 
                                                            
14ICT 07/01/2016, ICT 01/03/2016, ICT 16/03/2016. 
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the direct victims targeted by the new law. The effect is that the reader, as soon as he reads 
these sentences, feels sorrow and pain for the Tibetan people and, on the one hand, is keen on 
commiserating with them, and on the other hand, is keen on accusing the Chinese government 
for this law. In the same article there is also extensive use of images: these images show 
Tibetan protests against counter-terrorism training sessions for armed forces in Tibet, one self-
immolation staged as part of a counter-terrorist military drill's model, and police techniques 
for dealing with protesters demonstrated at the same military drill. All the images represent 
the Chinese military forces in the midst of violent actions. These images, in which the 
Chinese violence is the protagonist, make the reader identify the attribute of being violent 
with the Chinese military forces. The fact that images are extensively used is also noteworthy; 
indeed, visual material in an article is what first attracts the attention of the reader. As soon as 
the reader opens this document what he sees first are these violent images, therefore he is 
promptly confronted with the fact that “Chinese military forces in Tibet = violence.”  
Furthermore, the article goes further and beyond an objective reading and discussing of the 
new law when it links the law to Tibetan religion and the Dalai Lama. For instance, with 
regard to the fact that extremism can foment terrorism and is a risk for national security, the 
article cites that ‘in the context of the Chinese authorities openly blaming the Dalai Lama in 
exile for a wave of self-immolations across Tibet, keeping a small photograph of the Dalai 
Lama in exile (…) could conceivably be termed ‘extremist,’ and again, successively, it states 
that ‘a major religious teaching by the Dalai Lama in exile, (…) was described by the Chinese 
state media (...) as it incited terror.’ These statements deny the Chinese government’s 
arguments that the law is not targeted at any religion or geographical area. They also ridicule 
the Chinese authorities’ concerns about extremism in the situation of Tibetans keeping small 
images of the Dalai Lama. The last article focused on the invitation of the Dalai Lama to hold 
a conference on human rights with other Nobel Peace Prize laureates. The fact that the article 
states in the opening that ‘diplomats were among a packed audience listening to the Dalai 
Lama speaking about human rights and civil society’ implicitly alludes to the fact that, the 
same diplomats participating in the Human Rights Council were, on that occasion, “on the 
side” of the Dalai Lama because they did not take into account the fact that this invitation had 
incurred the Chinese government’s strong disapproval. The article strategically affirms this 
statement in the opening paragraph and it goes on to criticize the Chinese human rights record 
in Tibet. This strategy leads the reader to think that the conference held by the Dalai Lama 
also touched upon the situation of human rights in Tibet, even if it is not the reality in fact. 
Furthermore, the fact that the article mentions that diplomats are participating in the 
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conference, and that it further notes the lack of human rights in Tibet and also that it raises the 
topic of the Tibetan question, implicitly leads the reader to think that the same diplomats are 
also participating in the discussion around the Tibetan question, and are probably keen on 
urging China to defend and promote human rights in Tibet. This is not necessarily true, as 
many governments are now restraining and moderating the accusations and criticism toward 
China in the domain of human rights (especially because for most countries China has 
become the most important trade and business partner).   
 
Discussion 
 
The International community and the NGO campaigning for Tibet appear to play an important 
role in raising awareness/knowledge of Chinese violations in Tibet. Such interference in its 
internal affairs (the Tibetan issue is considered as an internal affair by the Chinese 
government) is viewed by the Chinese central government as a violation of its sovereignty. 
China wants to show to the International community that it not only plays an economic role in 
the global economy, but is also a political power (equal to Western countries, especially the 
USA). As a result, it repeatedly denies foreign accusations about its actions in Tibet. At the 
same time, it strengthens its control over Tibet. In fact, when uprisings happen in Tibet, they 
can sometimes lead to negative consequences for Tibetans (such as stricter Chinese military 
control). Media discourse is utilized by the central government to justify its policies and as a 
propaganda tool to justify its legitimacy. On the other side, the International community and 
the NGO campaigning for Tibet react by making statements which justify as legitimate their 
intervention in the dispute around the Tibetan question because it safeguards the fundamental 
human rights to which every human being is entitled. This verbal crossfire is a constituting 
trend that characterizes discussions of the Tibet question. In the final analysis, these 
discussions remain at the stage of verbal crossfire rather than establishing new political 
guidelines or implementing actual plans which change the situation in Tibet. The main reason 
for this attitude embraced by most of the foreign governments is the fact that governments are 
reluctant to openly oppose the PRC because its market is now considered the biggest in the 
world and thus is the favourite target of international competitors. Foreign governments 
ultimately prefer not to hold a firm stance for defending Tibetan self-determination and 
independence although they periodically accuse China for its human rights violations in Tibet 
(Blondeau & Buffetrille 2008: 52).     
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The 31
st.
 Human Rights Council, like other international events, has caused considerable 
discussions with regard to the current Tibetan situation. Furthermore, international events can 
also foment Tibetan hostility towards the Chinese control over Tibet. This hostility can 
sometimes give rise to Tibetan uprisings and revolts, such as the 2008 uprising in Lhasa (I 
discuss this uprising in the next chapter). Within Sino-Tibetan history, international events 
appear to be connected more than once to disputes between Chinese and Tibetans. How and to 
what extent have international events and influences had an impact on the attitudes and 
actions of Tibetans?    
     
In order to answer the question, I firstly note some examples of the international impact on 
Tibet before, during and immediately after the Chinese incorporation of Tibet and, secondly, I 
show the international impact on Sino-Tibetan relations in recent years. In this second section 
Tibet and the state theory is analyzed through the lens of Hoddie (2014) to the extent that this 
theory can provide some important insights with regard to the international influence on Han-
Tibetan clashes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. International interference and influence on Tibet 
 
3.1 International influence on Tibet from 1950s to 1970s 
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In this section I discuss international influence on Tibet from the 1950s until the 1970s. 
Blondeau & Buffetrille argue that it is from the 1950s onwards that the US began to be 
increasingly interested in Tibet (Blondeau & Buffetrille 2008: 49). This is mostly because in 
these years, after the Chinese communist victory in China, the world geo-political order was 
dictated and distorted by the logic of the Cold War. International relations were thus 
influenced by the opposition between Communist powers and non-Communist ones. The 
American interference in Tibet is therefore explained as being part of the Cold War strategies; 
the goal of US involvement in Tibet was determined by its anti-Communist agenda rather 
than any kind of interest in backing Tibetan independence (Ibid.). 
 
Also well-documented in Blondeau & Buffetrille’s book (2008), is the involvement of the 
CIA in supporting Tibetan guerrillas: during the 1950s the CIA provided a large amount of 
weapons and artillery to Tibetan separatists, and at the end of 1950s the CIA trained almost 
‘four hundred Tibetans in Guam, Okinawa and Colorado camp’ in guerrilla warfare (Ibid.). 
During the 1960s, the US, under the presidency of J.F. Kennedy, started to withdraw their 
presence in Tibet and in 1972 they withdrew any direct support to Tibetan guerrillas. Indeed, 
it was during this year that Sino-American relations improved with R. Nixon’s visit to China 
(Ibid.: 46, 50). 
 
Thus it can be claimed that the US ‘has meddled in Tibetan affairs;’ however, it should be also 
noted that the US (as well as other foreign countries) maintained their relations with China, 
rejecting Tibetan independent status (de jure recognition) and maintaining their favour 
towards China (Ibid.: 50). For instance, during the period of the American rapprochement 
with China, the Dalai Lama was repeatedly denied a visa by the American government 
(McLagan 2002: 93). 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2 International influence on Tibet in recent years: the segment-state theory       
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In this section I show what the segment-state theory is, how it is connected with Tibet and 
Sino-Tibetan relations, and its limits. Subsequently I illustrate some of the recent clashes 
between Han and Tibetans and suggest a possible explanation for their uprising. 
 
Definition of segment-state: ‘Segment-states are arrangements under which members of an 
ethnic group simultaneously enjoy both territorial and communal partitioning: homelands are 
designated as distinct jurisdictions and within those territories an ethnic community claims 
particular rights’ (Hoddie 2014: 67). 
 
According to the definition of a segment-state, the existence of segment-states increases the 
possibility of intrastate disputes over the question of the suitable balance of authority, 
legitimacy and power between the regional government (in this case Tibet) and the unitary 
state (in this case China). The distribution of power between the two is at stake; the dispute 
can escalate into violent clashes between the two competing parties when their commitment is 
intense and when the interests of the two parties are overlapping. Roeder (2007) argues
15
 that 
Tibet can be considered to have been a segment-state since 1951, because since then members 
of the leading Tibetan ethnic group employed political tactics that signalled their claim to 
separate from the PRC and to be an independent state. In his analysis, Roeder further 
demonstrates that it is because Tibet is a segment-state that the inter-ethnic clashes between 
Han and Tibetans are so frequent. On the other hand, Hoddie argues that Tibet cannot be 
considered a true segment-state therefore, in his view, the motives of the inter-ethnic clashes 
between Han and Tibetans lie on the international influence on the Tibetan question rather 
than on the fact that Tibet is a segment-state. There are two reasons why Tibet cannot be 
considered a segment-state. 
 
First of all, because the autonomy of Tibet’s regional government has been limited gradually 
yet constantly since 1959. Indeed, the autonomy of Tibet is arguable and only theoretical. The 
autonomy of Tibet has been limited in three dimensions: politics, religion and economy. 
Limitations on the political autonomy of Tibet are evident to the extent that the Chinese 
central state holds the major portion of power over the region (for instance Tibetans enjoy a 
limited presence within the CCP organs and the highest party position within the TAR has 
never been occupied by a Tibetan) (Blondeau & Buffetrille 2008: 196). 
                                                            
15 Roeder, Philip (2007), Where the Nation-states come from: Institutional change in the age of Nationalism, 
Princeton University Press. Cited in Hoddie 2014: 4. 
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Limitations on religious freedom, are immediately evident in the context of monasteries. In 
fact, monasteries face restrictions formulated by the Chinese central government. For instance, 
the government sets the number of monks which every monastery can have, those younger 
than 18 years old are denied permission to enter a monastery community, and monks are 
routinely obliged to attend ‘patriotic education’ campaigns (Hoddie 2014: 74; Blondeau & 
Buffetrille 2008: 164, 171). 
Limitations on the economic autonomy are evident, for instance, from the fact that Tibetan 
authorities are not enabled to limit the increasing number of Han migrants to the TAR in 
search of economic opportunities. Since the 1980s, Han migrants have been favoured by the 
Chinese government to go to Tibet and establish businesses and, because they usually have 
better skills than their Tibetan counter-parts, they usually hold better positions in the labour 
market (Sautman 2011: 3;  Zhu & Blachford 2012: 716-717, ibid.: 725,727; Blondeau & 
Buffetrille 2008: 243, 302).
16
 
 
Secondly, because the moments of inter-ethnic clashes since the occupation of Tibet by the 
Chinese People Liberation Army (PLA) are not entirely attributable to a dispute between the 
central state and the regional government. Rather, many of these clashes appear to have 
happened in connection with international events which put China in the spotlight of media 
coverage and which encouraged inter-ethnic confrontations (Hoddie 2014: 68). 
 
Hoddie’s study explores the most important clashes which involved Tibetan ethnic 
community and Han ethnic authorities in the period between 1955 and 1999. It is estimated 
that these clashes are frequent and Tibetans prove to be the minority nationality with the 
highest number of protests within the PRC. One of the protests the author mentioned is the 
protest which occurred in 2008. On that occasion monks in Lhasa started the protest: the 
protests in the capital city evolved into riots and were considered to be quite violent: at least 
21 people died during the protest (Hoddie 2014: 78). The protests rapidly spread from Lhasa 
to other cities in the Tibetan Plateau: it is estimated that 125 protests occurred. In response to 
these protests, the Chinese central government reacted by detaining the protestors and people 
associated with them. It is calculated that approximately 1,000 people were imprisoned or 
arrested because of their involvement in the protests (Ibid.). During 2008 China was in the 
                                                            
16 For a more comprehensive analysis of economic inequalities between Han and ethnic minorities, see: Zhu & 
Blachford (2012). 
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spotlight of international media coverage because it was going to host the Olympic Games; 
the protests therefore were widely covered and publicized by international media. 
 
It is important to note that many of the protests between Tibetans and Chinese police Hoddie 
refers to, have been connected with international events, for example, in the case of the 2008 
protests, the protests occurred during the period of the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing. 
Hoddie concludes by saying that, rather than explaining the clashes between Tibet and China 
in consideration of Tibet as a segment-state, two other factors appear to be more appropriate. 
The first is the deficiency of actual  autonomy for the Tibetan local government; the second is 
the fact that Tibetans have been protesting around the times in which the international 
community showed sympathy and/or assistance for the Tibetan campaign for more autonomy 
or even independence (Hoddie 2014: 83). 
 
In the previous sections I discussed the representations of Old and Contemporary Tibet, and 
the international influence on Tibet. I conclude the analysis by answering the question of why 
there are so many different discourses on Tibet and why they co-exist. In order to answer this 
question the next chapter illustrates the concept of strategic essentialism. 
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4. Strategic Essentialism
17
 
 
‘In a society where you define a group, and from a position of power you 
speak of this group, then the group must be allowed to have their voice 
heard. Indirectly, you force this voice to come forward’ (Eide 2010: 63). 
 
In the previous chapters the confluence of different discourses on Tibet during different 
historical periods and throughout the media has been shown. However, these discourses, even 
though claimed by different parties, which are claiming different goals, sometimes deploy the 
same images, recurrences and stereotypes. Why might this be the case? In order to discuss 
this question this section analyzes the concept of strategic essentialism; a concept formulated 
for the first time by Spivak (1988) and which has become important in post-colonial and 
feminist studies. I focus on this concept here because it can provide interesting insights in 
order to understand why a dominant discourse (for instance the Orientalist discourse) is 
internalized by a non-dominant group (in this case the Tibetan group). 
 
Spivak’s important contribution can be regarded as being the definition of two ways of 
representation in which a non-dominant group (which he calls oppressed group) is 
represented. The first one is representation as ‘speaking for’ an oppressed group; the second 
one is representation as ‘re-representation’ of the oppressed group (Spivak 1988: 70). 
 
The first mode of representation implies the oppressed group’s non-agency; the oppressed 
group’s agency is substituted by the agency of spokesperson that speaks on behalf of the 
group (the group is the object of representation). 
 
The second mode implies the oppressed group’s internalization of an alien, yet widely rooted, 
dominant discourse on itself, and the modification and its strategic use for the group’s 
personal purposes (the group is the subject of the representation because it represents itself). 
 
                                                            
17 In this section I interchange the nouns ‘oppressed group’ (Spivak), ‘marginal group’ (Spivak), ‘ethnic group’ 
(Eide), ‘minority group’ (Eide) to talk about an “Other” group in contrast with the dominant group. I interchange 
these words in order not to distort the concepts and the way in which are expressed by Spivak and Eide. It is 
noteworthy  understanding that these words are mentioned here to be related to the Tibetan ethnic minority. The 
Tibetan ethnic minority can thus be considered as a marginal group in comparison with the dominant Han group. 
I do not consider the Tibetan minority a (physically) oppressed group (which implies the use of physical 
violence); rather, the Tibetan minority can be considered a “discursively oppressed” group. 
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If the first mode of representation is deployed, the result is that the group’s spokesperson and 
representative becomes its master to the extent that he has authority, power, and influence 
over it  (Spivak 1988: 71). This modality of representation benefits only the representative 
part rather than the represented part: in fact, the oppressed group (“the Other”) is constituted 
and portrayed in discourse as the dominant group’s (“the Self’s”) reflection/mirror (Ibid.: 75). 
 
If the second representation modality is deployed, as soon as the group gets into contact with 
its own distorted, mythical, and artificial representation, it would try to contest it re-
representing itself. In this process, the group not only contests the dominant discourse, but it 
also defines its position, its ideology and its targets, and it consolidates them. This is a way in 
which a group can locally resist a dominant discourse by proposing not a completely different 
and alternative discourse, but rather, a complementary one (Ibid: 85). This complementary 
discourse uses the same language and recurrences that are deployed in the dominant discourse. 
Why? Because these recurrences are widely understood and acknowledged: they are the 
lingua franca between the marginal group and the rest of the world. If the group were to 
deploy a completely different discourse to portray itself, which the receivers of the discourse 
cannot recognise, the group’s goals and demands would face more challenges to be heard. 
 
Eide (2010) also offers important contributions with regard to the definition of strategic 
essentialism; her important contribution is the connections she has made between essentialism 
and ethnification. 
 
Eide argues that for a minority group to express itself and to be well-defined, it usually has to 
make compromises with the receiver (the majority group) with regard to its representation. In 
her text, the author states that essentialism goes hand in hand with the concept of ethnification. 
 
She defines ethnification as ‘a one-sided, dominant media focus on a person or group as an 
ethnic other, an emphasis on her difference (from a presumed ‘us’), based on her being (more 
or less) visibly different or on a tacitly presumed background that differs from the mainstream’ 
(Eide 2010: 66). 
 
She defines essentialism as a process of homogenising a group of people (the process can be 
initiated by the group itself or by other groups of people). The group is therefore portrayed as 
a holder of some shared characteristics which belong (only) to that particular group. 
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Connecting essentialism, ethnification and the modes of representation shown above, the way 
ethnic groups represent themselves makes use of essentialist practices in order to defend 
specific minority rights and to demand their guarantees (Ibid.). These essentialist practices are 
sometimes the result of a conscious internalization of an essentialism which others (the 
majority, or the powerful) have applied when representing the ethnic or minority group. In 
this way the group essentializes itself in order to adapt itself to the rules of the game set by 
the dominant group. For instance, it is easier to obtain media coverage when a story is 
concerned with minorities rather than with other groups of a society. In order to get media 
coverage the group also needs to create a representation of itself as different and sensational, 
extreme and differing from other groups’ representations. 
 
However, these marginal groups are willing to create stories the audience wants to hear: the 
reason why they are willing to do so is because this is a way to defend their interests and fulfil 
their goals (for instance the preservation of their cultural heritage and its uniqueness in 
contrast to a dominant mainstream culture) (Eide 2010: 70). This practice is one example of 
what is called a strategic essentialist practice. 
 
Strategic essentialism is ‘a minority strategy for influencing mainstream society’ (Ibid.: 76). 
As such, strategic essentialism presupposes that a group presents itself as homogeneous and 
the group essentializes itself in order to publicize a standardized public icon. This practice 
enables it to advance certain demands and to achieve its goals. However, one problem that 
may occur with strategic essentialist practices is that these practices, which standardize the 
group in order to achieve certain goals, are not consciously carried out by the members of the 
group (Ibid.). Rather, those practices are the result of the media conventions which look for 
the sensational and the unusual; therefore they essentialize a minority group portraying the 
represented subject with characteristics which have little to do with it. 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
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Finally, why are there so many different discourses about Tibet? Before answering this 
question, are these discourses actually different one from another? 
 
In the study I have proposed it seems clear that different discourses on Tibet have circulated 
and are circulating throughout geographical areas and historical periods. It has also been 
shown that, even if these discourses are defended by different parties which claim their 
personal objectives and demand their personal interests, it is common to see the same images, 
the same recurrent strategies and stereotypes portraying Tibet. In effect, the fact that a master 
narrative or dominant discourse on Tibet has been created by different actors does not imply 
that the parties at stake are either passively represented, without any possibility to let their 
voice being heard, or actively representing, silencing any alternative or marginal voice. This 
dominant discourse is still circulating because, actually, it can be considered as satisfying to 
higher or lower degrees, to all the parties at stake. 
 
Indeed, the strategic essentialism which I discussed in chapter four, can not only be deployed 
by the marginal group in order to represent itself, but it can also be deployed by the same 
group to essentialize the receiver of this representation. It can be argued that, not only can 
Tibet be considered “the victim” of orientalist ideas and myths of Tibet, but also the West can 
be considered “the victim” of being essentialized by Tibetans. Let me explain: When Tibetans 
portray themselves in a certain way (e.g. in accordance with Western media frames) they do 
so because they hope to get something in return. As such, if they foster their image as victims 
under Chinese rule, they might more easily receive international support; if they portray the 
Tibetan culture as “endangered,” they might obtain more international funds for preserving 
Tibetan cultural heritage and for international events which promote Tibetan culture and 
Tibetan Buddhism internationally. If they represent themselves as being deprived of 
fundamental human rights, they might obtain international support; if they support the 
environmentalists’ claims that it is important to preserve Tibetan environment, they might 
obtain more environmental protection for their land; finally, if Tibetans portray Tibet as a 
paradise lost, as a Shangri-La, they might get international media coverage from Hollywood 
film makers. 
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It is unclear whether these discourses actually benefit Tibet and Tibetans, but they supposedly 
provide the possibility to let Tibetan claims be heard in the media. 
 
Another problem I have not addressed in this analysis is the difference between Tibetans in 
Tibet and Tibetans in exile. This might be an important difference to take into account. The 
discourse on Tibet, defended by Tibetans and which is heard in foreign countries is indeed 
that which is defended not by the totality of Tibetans, but by the Tibetans in exile and, more 
specifically, by the members of the Tibetan government in exile. Also, the benefits this 
discourse can provide to Tibet do not necessary benefit Tibetans in Tibet. It seems that the 
voice that remains unheard with regard to the discourse on Tibet and on the Tibetan question 
is exactly that which belongs to the group which is most affected. What would be interesting 
for researchers to consider in the future is precisely the discourse on Tibet defended by those 
Tibetans who live in Tibet. The analysis of this discourse could be an important contribution 
to this research. 
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